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A COMPUTERIZED ONBOARD EXPEDITIOUS MONITOR 
AND MAINTENANCE ANALYST (EMMA) 
FOR SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS 
By Willard W. Anderson, Ralph W. Will, 
and Kenneth L. Jacobs 
Langley Research Center 
SUMMARY 
A computerized monitor and maintenance system for  automatic spacecraft system 
fault isolation and repair  is defined. 
maintenance analyst (EMMA). 
This system is called an expeditious monitor and 
Rationale for the requirement of such a system and gen­
eral cri teria for the synthesis of such a system are presented. A CDC 6600 computer 
was used to simulate the maintenance system in operation onboard a space station. 
CDC 6600 was programed to operate in real time and linked to a full-scale prototype 
control moment gyro (CMG) attitude control system. 
The 
A discussion of the performance 
of the simulated maintenance system and i t s  ability to diagnose correctly and repair 
CMG system failures is included. 
INTRODUCTION 
Future manned spacecraft will be required to perform more complex tasks than 
present spacecraft and to operate in space for increasingly longer periods of time. 
Spacecraft systems will accordingly become more complex and of necessity include more 
components. Program cost considerations will dictate that spacecraft system costs not 
rise appreciably; therefore, component costs must be decreased. 
Given spacecraft systems comprised of larger  numbers of components, with the 
components produced at lower cost, and adding the requirement of longer system opera­
tional life, a technology concerned with system, rather than component, reliability must 
evolve. System reliability through fast automatic replacement of faulty comp0nent.s by 
"off the shelf" components would be less expensive than insuring high individual compo­
nent reliability. This technology should consider system maintenance, system status 
monitoring, system fault diagnosis, and component replacement. The technology should 
utilize automatic deterministic logic schemes to the extent that the technology is con­
cerned with repetitious events. Man's participation should be minimal if  at all; thus 
the technology is required to  utilize machine information processing and decision making 
with visual display, printed, or  vocal information transmittal only when man's involve­
ment is required. 
The above concepts were the rationale for  the development OP a maintenance system, 
called an expeditious monitor and maintenance analyst (EMMA). The EMMA is comprised 
of a central unit containing digital processing and memory hardware, input-output and dis­
play hardware, and signal switching hardware local t o  each system being maintained. 
Advantages afforded by such a maintenance system onboard a large spacecraft include 
1. Lower required component reliability and therefore lower cost 
2. 	Extended system operational life, afforded by optimal use of remaining func­
tioning components 
3. Fault prediction based on high sensitivity system status signal monitoring 
4. Rapid fault isolation and correction 
5. Reduced astronaut "housekeeping" complement 
Disadvantages include increased complexity and the possibility of computer e r ror .  Oper ­
ator intervention consisting of direct component status signal readout augmented by print -
out of computer actions taken will permit error override and corrections. 
SYMBOLS 
k rate of energy accumulation 
c.1 effort state vector 
69 flow state vector 
P power 
P1 input power 
p2 output power 
P component -failure-prediction probability 
T( {x}) signal-flow-component operator 
t $0 t ime (fig. 18) 
{XI signal-flow-component input vector 
2 
X component test input 
signal-flow-component output vector 
Y response to  test signal 
� performance constraint transducer reading 
�0 transducer boundary 
MAINTENANCE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Basic maintenance system operational blocks a r e  shown in figure 1. These blocks 
include a signal converter, digital processing and memory units, control and display 
units for  astronaut participation, and signal switching units, local t o  each system being 
maintained. The signal switching units allow signal (information) flow either to  o r  from 
system components. The converter includes digita1-to -analog , analog-to -digital, and 
discrete closure conversion and input/output equipment for  the digital computer processor 
and the control unit. The memory unit contains system component reference, tolerance, 
and sampling-time information for the monitor routines; reference information for the 
diagnostic routines; and schedules for preventive maintenance. 
The maintenance system has four main operational modes: 
Monitor/Maint enance 
Classification/Prediction 
Diagnostic 
Repair/Replace 
Description of these modes of operation requires definition and discussion of the fol­
lowing t e rms  and rationale concerning the spacecraft systems to be maintained. 
Monitor/Maintenance 
The basic maintenance unit for a system being maintained is arbitrari ly designated 
as the component, where groups of components form subsystems of the spacecraft sys­
tem being maintained. Component replacement is the basic maintenance action. The 
two basic types of components are designated as signal flow and energy flow. Signal-
flow components require power for operation but approach, or  can be idealized as, single-
vector transfer functions with specified causality and negligible power flow. Figure 2(a), 
illustrates such a system component where the vector {X} is operated on by T({X}) 
causing {Y}, o r  
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For the idealized signal-flow component the power supplied is dissipated as heat with no 
storage of energy within the component. Energy-flow components (refer to  fig. 2(b)) are 
those components concerned with the direct dynamics of the physical system and are 
characterized by an input o r  output state 
= Power = P 
The state vectors (.} and {f} refer to  effort and flow variables (refs. 1 and 2), 
such as voltage and current,  force and linear velocity, torque and angular speed, pres­
sure  and flow rate, and so forth. Energy can accumulate within an energy-flow compo­
nent, the rate of energy accumulation I? being 
6 = PI - ( ~ 2-+ Heat) 
Transducer signal outputs {Y} and control signal inputs (X} are available and pro­
vide state measurement and control capability. Positive energy flow direction is indi­
cated by the energy flow-line half arrow (-), and single-allowed energy flow direction is 
denoted by a full arrow (+). For convenience, since both types of components may have 
heat loss,  the heat-loss arrow is omitted unless the heat loss plays a significant part  in 
system operat  ion. 
The operational status of a system is defined as being a function of two types of 
system constraints: design constraints associated with energy-flow components and 
performance constraints associated with signal-flow components. Design constraints 
refer to  excessive energy accumulation o r  flow within an energy-flow component; per­
formance constraints are those imposed on certain signal-flow vectors or  formulations 
of these vectors by the system objectives. Examples of excessive energy design con­
straints are high accumulator pressure,  high gyro rotor speed, and high stress in an 
actuator. Excessive energy flow design constraints could be overload currents or  high 
volume flows in lines. Performance constraints refer  to  allowable limits for vectors of 
selected signal-flow components, examples being the servo e r r o r  of a controller and the 
partial pressure of oxygen in a controlled environment. 
Design constraints, because of the dangers associated with accumulated energy or 
energy flow, must be locally monitored with local action to  effect a reversal of the accu­
mulation of energy or excessive energy flow. Examples of such devices are safety valves 
on tanks o r  accumulators, fuses o r  circuit breakers in electrical lines, rotor overspeed 
t r ips  on control moment gyros, and so forth. 
Serial monitoring of the state of energy-flow-component local action devices and 
selected signal-flow performance constraints determines the operational status of a 
given system being maintained. This function plus scheduled preventive maintenance 
(programed address of maintenance actuators) constitutes the nominal operational mode 
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(monitor/maintenance) of EMMA. The monitoring is accomplished by serial address of 
appropriate constraint transducers by processor controlled discretes sent to spacecraft-
system switching units. The status signals thus addressed a r e  compared with reference 
values for  specific sampling t imes (multiples of the basic iteration rate) and the differ­
ences adjudged to be within o r  not within reference tolerances. This mode, including 
the transmittal of scheduled preventive maintenance signals to appropriate component 
maintenance actuators, continues until a status signal is adjudged not within its refer­
ence tolerance. When this occurs, the maintenance system mode changes to 
classification/pr ediction. 
Classification/Prediction 

In this mode statistical averaging routines a r e  used over an increased sampling 
time to determine whether the indication of faulty operation is intermittent o r  continuous. 
If the indication is intermittent (i.e., cannot meet the failure cr i ter ia  of the classification/ 
prediction mode), the information is stored in the memory unit and forms the basis for 
failure prediction. Failure prediction requires that a status signal be intermittently out 
of tolerance at an increasing rate. When the increasing rate is detected, the rate is 
extrapolated and a failure date, based on not meeting the failure cr i ter ia  of the 
classification/prediction mode, is predicted. One approach to this prediction is dis­
cussed in appendix A. This is the first category of information transmitted to the astro­
naut and has the lowest priority for specific action. This information includes system 
and component transducer identification, probable failure date, automatic action that will 
occur when failure occurs, and any required request for manual assistance. If the out­
of-tolerance indication is adjudged continuous, the maintenance mode changes to diag­
nostic. This third mode includes the preponderance of the computer routines of the sys­
tem and represents the bulk of the work reported herein. The diagnostic routines are 
called serially, as required, from the memory and replace the monitor or  prediction 
routines in the processor. 
Diagnostic 
The diagnostic routines called depend on which performance o r  design constraints 
are adjudged not within reference tolerances. These routines establish which component 
is not functioning properly by using programed deterministic logic. The diagnostic 
routines include characteristically (1)appropriate system reconfiguration for diagnosis, 
(2) tes t  pulse firing to pertinent components, and (3) machine decision based on compo­
nent response to test  pulses. Diagnostic routine decisions a r e  internal to the computer 
and require no action by the astronaut. 
Repair /Replace 
Subsequent to diagnostic decision and diagnostic routine termination, the main­
tenance mode changes to repair/replace. This final mode calls pertinent repair/replace 
routines from the memory unit based on diagnostic-mode output, searches hardware 
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availability logs, and takes appropriate action, These actions may include automatic 
parallel-component switching, automatic system reconfiguration, or  manual component 
repair  o r  replacement. Logic pertaining to these actions is discussed in appendix B. 
In any case, the astronaut receives information which includes system and component 
identification, diagnostic results, automatic action taken, and again, any required request 
for  manual assistance. The mode control then returns to  monitor/maintenance. 
CRITERIA FOR SYSTEM SYNTHESIS 
The cr i ter ia  for system synthesis pertain to the spacecraft systems to  be main­
tained by the EMMA, in particular to the required modifications to these systems for 
automatic maintenance by the EMMA. An example of the application of these cr i ter ia  to  
a control moment gyroscope (CMG) attitude control system is given in the next section of 
this paper. These cri teria,  which a r e  based on the general rationale discussed in the 
previous section, a r e  as follows: 
Identify the energy-flow and signal-flow components of the system to be 
maintained. 
Determine the design constraints associated with the energy-flow components 
and designate appropriate local action devices. 
Determine the performance constraints associated with the signal-flow com­
ponents and designate transducers for monitoring the state of these con­
straints and also the state of the local action devices. 
Specify required preventive maintenance actions, schedules for actions, and 
actuators. 
Specify data for component-failure-prediction routines (appendix A). 
Determine the appropriate logic for the diagnostic routines. This logic includes 
system reconfiguration for diagnosis, component test  inputs and required 
responses, and associated constraint address module (CAM) and pulse address 
module (PAM) discrete commands (appendix B). 
Determine the appropriate logic for the component replacement routines. This 
logic includes component selection, component warmup, system reconfigura­
tion, and associated CAM and PAM discrete commands. 
EMMA SIMULATION DESCRIPTION 
The operational characteristics of an onboard expeditious monitor and maintenance 
analyst (EMMA) have been simulated on a CDC 6600 digital computer programed to 
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operate in a real-time mode. This simulation is incorporated in the space station dynam­
ics  simulation at the Langley Research Center which includes a complete flexible space­
craft model, simulated control computer software, and a pilot control console (fig. 3). 
The space station dynamics simulation links to full-scale laboratory prototype control 
moment gyro (CMG) system hardware (figs. 4 and 5). The CMG system consists of three 
double-gimbaled, constant-speed wheels which a r e  precessed by servocontrollers to  pro­
vide spacecraft control torques as described in reference 3. This simulation has allowed 
the EMMA rationale and cr i ter ia  to be evaluated for a typical spacecraft system requiring 
automatic monitoring and maintenance. The EMMA software communicates with the 
CMG hardware with both analog and discrete input and output functions. The simulation 
is controlled from the program control station shown in figure 6. This station allows 
control over the CDC 6600 computer and input-output hardware. The station includes a 
simulation console for data entry and control, a display console for postoperative data 
display, recorders,  X Y  plotters, a typewriter for data exit and operator comment, and 
site communications. 
The CDC 6600 computer itself uses 60-bit words; the digital-to-analog converter 
(DAC) and analog-to-digital converter (ADC) input-output units have 15-bit resolution 
over a &lOO-volt range; and the discrete functions represent relay contact closures with 
2.5-millisecond response times. The required computer interface with the CMG hard­
ware for EMMA consists of 12 discrete computer outputs, one analog input (ADC), and 
one analog output (DAC). Interface with the pilot control console for display and manual 
monitoring'requires 15 discrete computer outputs, 18 discrete computer inputs, one analog 
input, and one analog output. An on-line typewriter provides a second display function and 
record of system operation. Digital computer requirements for EMMA a r e  4100 words of 
memory and an average of 200 microseconds for each pass through the EMMA logic. 
There has been no attempt to minimize the storage of the present simulation. An 
immediate reduction of this memory requirement by two-thirds could be accomplished 
since the CMG system consists of three identical CMG's. Further reduction could be 
realized through overlay techniques whereby only the routine (monitor, diagnostic, etc.) 
presently being utilized by the system would reside in the central memory at any one 
time. All routines could be stored on a slow-access memory unit (tape, disk file, etc.) 
and called into the central memory as required. This overlay technique could be applied 
to an EMMA responsible for all spacecraft systems by "occupying" the central processor 
with an executive routine which calls up specific maintenance system routines from the 
slow-access memory. Because of the ser ia l  requirements for such maintenance routines, 
the central processor memory and speed requirements become small. 
The space station simulation operates at 32 iterations (computer cycles) pe r  second 
and requires about 10 milliseconds per  computer cycle. In addition to the computer 
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hardware three types of peripheral  hardware, local t o  the spacecraft system being 
maintained (the CMG system for  this simulation), are required. These are (1)switching 
units (CAM and PAM), (2) measurement transducers,  and (3) computer-controlled 
actuators. 
The switching units used in this simulation are conventional relay "trees" (fig. 7) 
requiring six discretes to  define a path from any one of 26 (64) signal leads to  a single 
lead. Two such relay trees are required - one to enable the computer to read the mea­
surement transducers and another to  enable the computer t o  command the actuators 
within the system being maintained. Mechanical relays rather than electronic switches, 
such as field-effect t ransis tors  (FET's) and metal oxide silicon field-effect transistors 
(MOSFET's), were chosen for several  reasons. The basic computer cycle t ime is com­
patible with the closure t imes of available relays. Simplicity of design was obtained when 
relays were utilized since the problem of individual gating voltages associated with elec­
tronic switches was avoided. The use of relays with two-pole capacity reduced the num­
ber  of switching components by a factor of 2. The reliability of a tree utilizing relays is 
higher than one associated with electronic switches, and finally, highly conditioned power 
supplies are not necessary. 
Thirty-two double-pole double-throw relays were utilized in each tree. The type 
of relay chosen has a low inertia and low response t ime and is highly reliable. Flight-
qualified models a r e  available commercially. The relay tree used for measurement 
transducers connects various chosen CMG parameters to  an operational amplifier of 
*lOO-volt capability with a 1-megohm input impedance. The high input impedance allows 
relay contacts in the monitor t ree  to  accumulate as much as several  kilohms of resis­
tance without detrimental effects. The second relay tree (internally identical with that 
above) receives a command voltage f rom a computer-controlled DAC and directs the 
voltage to  one of the actuators within the CMG system. 
Measurement transducers convert various CMG system parameters such as heat, 
wheel speed, wheel vibration, and so forth to signals that the computer can recognize. 
The desired signals in this application must have large t ime constants relative to  the 
monitor cycle t ime to prevent aliasing. Mechanical parameters such as temperature, 
vibration, and wheel speed are measured by thermistors,  accelerometers, and inductive 
pickups, respectively. Electrical parameters such as rotor current are measured by 
current transformers.  In addition, local action devices are required to  insure that energy 
accumulation is bounded. All measured parameters which are cyclic in nature must fur­
ther  be filtered o r  rectified to prevent aliasing as previously mentioned, except for per­
formance constraint transducers readings, in which case the computer sample rate is 
increased. 
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The computer control actuators for CMG system reconfiguration and component 
switching provide the final link between the computer and the CMG hardware. These 
actuators assist in the diagnostic portion of the program by providing the capability of 
isolating various hardware components f rom the system for performance checks and 
also provide the capability of rem0ving.a defective component and replacing it with a 
spare. 
The actuators chosen were magnetic latching relays. These relays were used 
because of their  high reliability, simplicity of design, and broad range of voltage and 
current handling capability. Also, latching relays do not require continuous coil energiza­
tion in either contact position. This feature was highly desirable in this application since 
the relay may be required to remain in either position for indefinite periods of time. 
EMMA Logic Description 
Figure 8 shows a block diagram of the overall EMMA simulation routine. The sys­
tem operation is divided into two basic sections: a monitor routine which simulates the 
first two EMMA modes and a diagnostic scheme which simulates the second two EMMA 
modes. The monitor addresses the CMG system transducers in binary code and moni­
to r s  their output, and the diagnostic, called upon detection of a system malfunction, inter­
rogates individual CMG components to locate the specific failure and initiate corrective 
action. Both the monitor and diagnostic routines a re  accessible through manual inputs 
from the pilot control console. The system utilizes one analog input channel (ADC) for 
the monitor and one analog output channel (DAC) for the diagnostic. The binary-coded 
relay-tree addresses for the monitor and diagnostic require six output discretes each 
and provide the capability to monitor 64 CMG system parameters and issue 64 correc­
tive action commands. 
The monitor routine (monitor/maintenance) operation is described schematically 
in figure 8. The computer uses  a gray code format shown in table I to address sequen­
tially the 64 CMG system parameters.  The six-discrete-parameter address is made up 
and issued to the monitor relay tree.  At the same time, the proper reference and toler­
ance values for the CMG system parameter to be monitored are placed in the comparator 
routine. A finite time later (at least 50 milliseconds), the analog line is read by the com­
parator. If the value is within tolerance, a sequencer notifies the system to set up the 
address of the next parameter. Preventive maintenance commands are not included in 
this simulation. If the monitored value is not within tolerance, an averaging routine 
(classification/prediction) is set  up which reads the value continuously (32 t imes per  
second) for a specified time associated with the time constant of the parameter in ques­
tion. At the end of this time, the averaged value of the parameter is checked by the com­
parator. If this value is within tolerance, the sequencer is tripped; if not, the diagnostic 
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scheme is called. This information would form the basis for component or  system fail­
u re  prediction. Several parameters such as bearing temperature and vibration initiate 
no diagnostic action but involve shutting off the CMG spin power. The monitor routine 
continues to check the parameter and turns the CMG on again if the value comes back 
within tolerance. 
Before the diagnostic scheme is described, a brief description of the manual inter­
face with the monitor routine will complete the monitor description. In the automatic 
mode, the computer will continuously sequence through the CMG system parameters 
(table I) at  any rate desired up to approximately 16 parameters per second, a limit 
imposed by simulation equipment input/output restrictions. The parameter readings 
may be displayed continuously on a digital voltmeter on the pilot control console, shown 
in figure 9. Binary coding of the addressed parameters is displayed by lights in the 
lower section of the manual address switches. The astronaut may elect at any time to 
check any parameter b3 setting up its binary code on the manual address switches and 
inserting this information into the computer. This halts the automatic sequence, 
addresses the desired parameter,  and displays its output continuously on the digital 
voltmeter. This manual override provides the capability for manual system checkout 
and manual monitoring of a questionable system component. 
The diagnostic routine is basically a logic scheme which takes the malfunction 
indication from the monitor, interrogates additional components to isolate the specific 
failure (diagnostic), checks whether redundant equipment is available for replacement, 
determines what corrective action is in order,  and initiates action either to repair  the 
fault (repair/replace) o r  to notify the control computer that the system must operate in 
a failure mode (1CMG failed and removed from the control loop). The specific diagnos­
t ic  logic employed is necessarily different for each type of system failure. Indeed, some 
system malfunctions such as bearing temperature and bearing vibration require no fur­
ther diagnosis to determine that the CMG must be shut down until the lack of input power 
reduces the temperature o r  vibration. This fact would be noted by the monitor and the 
CMG reactivated. Other than these obvious cases,  there a r e  two primary sets of diag­
nostic logic: that used to determine specifically which power supply has failed and that 
to determine which component of a CMG gimbal servo loop is causing a servo e r r o r  
(performance constraint). These will be discussed separately in detail along with their 
associated component replacement sequences to illustrate this operation. 
Power Supply Diagnostic 
The individual CMG rotor and gimbal devices operate on several  types of input 
power: 28 volts, &15volts, 5 volts, and 26 volts. A schematic of a typical CMG system 
power distribution system, including appropriate replacements, is shown in figure 10. 
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The entire system operates f rom a 28-volt dc bus with separate 15-volt, 5-volt, and 
26-volt power supplies for  each individual CMG. These a r e  driven by a separate inverter 
for  each CMG. The power supplies are thus interrelated, and the indicated failure of a 
15-volt supply for example could be due to an inverter failure or  a 28-volt-supply fail­
ure. Isolation of the exact malfunction involves a straightforward check back up the line 
until the faulty component is located. No provision has been made for the 28-volt-bus 
failure since this wil l  shut down the entire system and should be monitored as a part  of 
the spacecraft electrical power system. An example of failure isolation logic is shown 
schematically in figure 11for a typical 15-volt-failure indication. One of the other power 
supplies operating f rom the inverter, in this case the 5-volt supply, is immediately 
addressed and monitored. If this output is within tolerance, the 15-volt supply has been 
identified as the malfunctioning component; if the 5-volt supply is also out of tolerance, 
interest is shifted to the inverter. The 28-volt output is then addressed and checked to 
determine whether the fault l ies within the inverter o r  the 28-volt supply. When the 
faulty component is isolated, a check is made to determine whether a replacement is 
available. As shown in figure 10, one replacement unit of each type of power supply is 
available for use in any individual CMG. The status of this unit is stored within the com­
puter and once it has been used, any future call for that power supply type will not locate 
a replacement. This will result in a CMG shutdown unless the replacement has been 
restored by the crew since the previous failure. 
Identification of the faulty power supply and location of an available replacement 
initiates the following power-supply replacement sequence: 
1. Switch CMG out of control loop 
2. Start replacement power supply 
3. Shut down CMG spin power 
Warmup 	 4. Disconnect inner-gimbal power amplifier output 
period . isconnect outer-gimbal power amplifier outputI
6. Switch out failed power supply 
7. Switch in replacement power supply 
8. Connect outer-gimbal power amplifier output 
9. Connect inner-gimbal power amplifier output 
10. Reactivate CMG spin power 
11. Switch CMG into control loop 
Note: All operations except 1and 11 require two computer iterations - one to  set 
PAM address and one to pulse system actuator relay. 
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The commands in this sequence a re  transmitted via the six binary-coded discretes to  
the command relay t ree  of figure 7. The replacement power supply is activated first so 
that it may warm up pr ior  to being switched in. The CMG spin power is shut down and the 
CMG remains out of the control loop during the entire sequence. The gimbal servo loop 
power amplifiers for both gimbals a r e  disconnected from the gimbal torque motors t o  
avoid transient-created damage to the gimbal drives during power-supply switchover. 
The faulty power supply is then switched out, and when the warmup period for the replace­
ment is over, the new unit is switched in. The gimbal servo loops are reconnected and 
spin power again applied. The sequencer then notifies the computer routine that the 
operation is complete so that the CMG may again be switched into the control loop and 
the monitor sequence may resume. 
The original parameter e r r o r  and the corrective action taken are stored in binary-
coded form which is available for pilot interrogation from the manual console shown in 
figure 9. In addition, both a r e  recorded in alphanumeric form by an on-line typewriter 
for  permanent record and subsequent analysis as shown in figure 12. 
CMG System Error Diagnostics 
A geqeral system diagnostic technique is discussed in appendix B for a hypothetical 
system. This technique, in principle, was used to synthesize diagnostic routines for the 
CMG system illustrated in figure 13. These diagnostic routines a r e  aimed at isolating a 
faulty component in the system when an out -of -tolerance performance constraint at any 
of the lettered points is indicated. The diagnostic software sequence described below is 
outlined in figure 14 for the CMG system block diagram of figure 13. These two figures 
represent a special case of the two general system figures discussed in appendix B and 
the notation is the same. The vehicle-attitude sensor loop is not included in this simula­
tion since actual sensor hardware is not used but modeled in the computer. The per­
formance constraint at point C is generated by comparing the desired control computer 
output rate of change of momentum with a rate of change of momentum based on CMG 
gimbal sensor outputs. The performance constraint at point D is generated by comparing 
steering-law-generated CMG precession-rate commands with motor tachometer outputs 
(servo loop er rors ) .  Both performance constraints are monitored. The necessity for  
monitoring point D ar i ses  from the relative insensitivity of the performance constraint 
to failure o r  partial failure of one of the six CMG gimbal servo loops (point D). 
A performance constraint e r r o r  at point C may be due either to one servo loop 
e r r o r  (loop D) o r  a steering-law-loop failure. A failure of this type involves opening the 
resolver feedback and serially pulsing each of the six servo loops and checking their out­
puts. If these a r e  all correct,  the six servo loops a r e  again pulsed and the gimbal tach­
ometers checked to determine whether the gimbals are moving. Once gimbal motion is 
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established, the gimbal sensors  (resolvers) are checked by again pulsing the gimbal servo 
and checking the resolver outputs. Positive indications on all cheeks indicate an e r r o r  in 
the steering law in the control computer. 
The CMG gimbal servo e r ro r ,  whether detected by the monitor o r  the CMG system 
e r r o r  diagnostic, involves opening the motor tachometer feedback and pulsing the gimbal 
power amplifier. The output of the power amplifier (E), gimbal tachometer (12),and 
motor tachometer (4)are checked to  isolate the specific faulty component. All positive 
responses to  these pulses indicate that the preamplifier itself is bad. Once the pre­
amplifier has been isolated as the source of the problem, a replacement sequence similar 
to  the CMG power supply replacement is initiated. The CMG spin power is shut off and 
the power amplifier outputs on both gimbals are disconnected to  avoid gimbal damage. 
The bad preamplifier is switched out and the replacement preamplifier input is connected. 
After preamplifier warmup, the preamplifier output is switched into the loop and the gim­
bal actuators are again connected to the power amplifier. The CMG spin power is reac­
tivated and the CMG placed back in the control loop. 
SIMULATED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
The EMMA software was programed, and computer-generated failure conditions 
were used to check out the basic logic operations. The simulation was then linked to  the 
CMG hardware and actual component failures simulated to verify the EMMA diagnostic 
logic and repair  sequences. Since it is not desirable to  fail operational CMG system com­
ponents, only those failure conditions which could readily be simulated were investigated. 
Mechanical failures such as sheared gear trains and gimbal binding could not be repre­
sented but most of the system component failures were considered. A description.of how 
the CMG system failures were generated and the action taken by EMMA follows. The 
prediction mode was not simulated because computer time (and therefore cost) would 
have been excessive. 
The bearing-temperature and vibration signals were biased to  simulate high values 
of these parameters. The EMMA routine detected these out-of-tolerance conditions and 
shut off CMG spin power so that the situation might be allowed to  improve. The bias 
signals were then removed, and when the monitor determined that the readings were 
again normal, the CMG was reactivated and switched back into the control loop. EMMA 
then noted that the CMG wheel speed was below tolerance and issued a request for manual 
assistance. The typewriter record of CMG shutdown because of excessive bearing tem­
perature o r  vibration showed that the CMG could be left in the control loop until the rotor 
speed returned to  normal. 
The CMG power-supply failures were simulated by simply disconnecting the power-
supply output. EMMA detected the failure and proceeded with the power-supply 
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replacement sequence previously described. The power-supply replacement was simu­
lated by a computer-actuated relay which reconnected the power-supply output and thus 
actually made the CMG operational. Inverter and 28-volt-bus supply failures were 
simulated by disconnecting the output of the affected power supplies shown in figure 10. 
It was not possible to  simulate the replacement of this equipment since the laboratory 
prototype hardware does not use these components, as would a flight system for  which 
the EMMA logic was designed. 
Several servo loop failures were simulated to  check out the servo loop diagnostic 
routines. Preamplifier and power amplifier failures were simulated by imposing on 
their  output a bias which represented the opening of these components and drove the gim­
bal open loop. Disconnection of the bias signal as a par t  of the replacement sequence 
simulated the switching in of a new component. A feedback loop failure was simulated 
by disconnecting the motor tachometer output. No repair  was effected in this case since 
a bad motor tachometer would have to  be replaced o r  repaired manually for the proto­
type CMG's. Gimbal resolver failures were simulated by disconnecting the gimbal 
potentiometer output. Again, this repair  would have to  be accomplished manually for the 
prototype CMG's. The computer action consisted of printing out the e r r o r  and a request 
for  manual assistance. These were all the CMG system failures which could be realis­
tically simulated with the prototype hardware. 
The monitor and diagnostic sampling period used for the hardware checks was 
0.5 second so  that the entire system was monitored every 32 seconds. At this sampling 
rate, the longest diagnostic (servo loop) required approximately 3 seconds to  locate the 
failure component. The component replacement sequence is characteristically about 
1 second in duration excluding component warmup time. The overall system, including 
the hardware interface, worked well for  the component failures simulated, which should 
be representative for all system malfunctions. The automatic switching sequence for 
component replacement also works smoothly and appears reasonable for spacecraft 
applications where automatic repair  o r  replacement is feasible. 
The prototype hardware interface verification runs have indicated a strong need for 
checking out the logic with actual hardware to  make sure  that the symptoms exhibited by 
the faulty hardware are properly recognized and diagnosed by EMMA. For this reason, 
techniques of simulating all CMG system failures including mechanical failures should 
be developed and the logic checked completely pr ior  to  implementation in an actual space­
craft application. EMMA system operation from the manual console has been checked 
out in conjunction with the monitor routine and the binary display of system malfunctions. 
From these operations, it appears that a manual override capability is extremely desir­
able fo r  all steps of the fault isolation and repair  operation. The binary e r r o r  display 
proved to  be much more limited than the typewriter readout in the amount of information 
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which could be provided for analysis by man. For this reason, it is felt that an alpha­
numeric display of some type is essential for an onboard fault isolation and maintenance 
system. The EMMA printout, shown in figure 12, provides the time of failure detection, 
the faulty component, the average output of that component when the failure was detected, 
and the action taken o r  requested by the computer. As shown in figure 12 ,  one possible 
EMMA action is the activation of the spacecraft reaction control system (RCS). For 
actual spacecraft applications, an entire ser ia l  record of the operations performed and 
the diagnostic and repair  routines used by the computer in isolating and correcting the 
system e r r o r  would be more useful to an astronaut in any subsequent analysis of the 
problem. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The feasibility of a maintenance system which can automatically monitor, diagnose, 
and repair onboard spacecraft systems in operation has been demonstrated. Ground 
rules which permit the design of an automatic maintenance system have been established 
by the synthesis of an expeditious monitor and maintenance analyst (EMMA). 
Laboratory operation with the EMMA system has shown that an automatic checkout 
and repair capability is extremely useful. The EMMA simulation has minimized simula­
tion setup time to  such a degree that this routine has been incorporated in all control 
moment gyro hardware simulations. It has been concluded that a fully automatic main­
tenance system which includes component replacement capability, such as the EMMA 
described in this report, is essential and should offset increasing spacecraft system 
cost, complexity, and lifetime requirements. 
Evaluation of the performance of a simulated EMMA indicated several factors 
pertinent to system checkout and astronaut participation. The system software should 
be linked to the actual spacecraft system hardware to validate performance pr ior  to  
finalizing the software routines. In addition, the computer printout should be as com­
plete as possible in informing an astronaut what has been found wrong in the spacecraft 
system and what the computer has done to isolate and correct the fault. Also, the astro­
naut should have complete manual override capability over the automatic monitor, diag­
nostic, and repair operations as a backup in the event that computer software routines 
contain e r r o r s  o r  omissions. This override capability should include astronaut callup 
of the appropriate routines and reprograming capabilities. 
Langley Research Center, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Langley Station, Hampton, Va., December 16, 1969. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMPONENT FAILURE PREDICTION 
This appendix presents one approach to  the problem of automatic component fail­
ure  prediction. In figure 15 a typical performance constraint transducer reading E is 
plotted against time. The a rea ,  bounded by the positive and negative values of the per­
formance constraint e o  represents monitor/maintenance mode allowed transducer 
readings. The durations of the out-of-tolerance readings are shown in the lower part 
of the figure, as are the points in time at which the computer samples the reading. Also 
shown is the number of readings detected to  be out of tolerance. Assuming that the 
samples a r e  taken at random, the probability of detection p is equal to  the total out-of­
tolerance duration divided by the total time and also equal to the number of detected out­
of-tolerance readings divided by the number of samples. Therefore, by setting the 
values of E O  used in the monitor/maintenance mode to  be more stringent than those 
used in the classification/prediction mode (this permits a large number of initial out-of­
tolerance readings pr ior  to system diagnosis and component replacement), the probabil­
ity p becomes a measure of performance. Finite Taylor's series extrapolation can be 
used to predict when, in time, this parameter p will increase to a value where system 
diagnosis and component replacement a r e  required. 
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APPENDIX B 
SYSTEM DIAGNOSTIC ROUTINES 
A'maintenance block diagram for a hypothetical spacecraft system typical in 
principle t o  most spacecraft systems containing energy-flow components (EFC-1) and 
signal-flow components (SFC-1) is illustrated in figure 16. The energy flow for this 
system is indicated by solid lines and the signal flow by broken lines. Even-numbered 
signal-flow components represent measurement devices and odd-numbered components 
represent analog computation (preamplifier) or  digital computation hardware. The num­
bers  refer to  points at which signal-measurement transducers are located, points at 
which EMMA controlled input commands can be applied, or  points at which the signal 
path can be broken. The lettered points refer to  performance constraint transducers and 
would be, typically, errors between desired performance and performance as measured 
by the even-numbered signal-flow components. The performance constraint transducer 
at point A is considered indicative of overall system performance and as such is the only 
constraint checked by the monitor. If this performance reading is out of tolerance, a 
diagnostic routine is necessary to  isolate the component of the system that is responsible 
for the poor performance. 
A general procedure for synthesizing the diagnostic logic for the system of fig­
ure  16 is shown in figure 17. The logic flow begins at point A and ends by designating 
the faulty component. The scheme followed is to (1)open the outermost feedback loop; 
(2) evaluate the performance of the conglomerate internal loop; and (3) evaluate the t rans­
f e r  functions of all components outside the internal loops with the conglomerate loop 
being used as a portion of the input signal path to the faulty component. The diagram may 
be followed through to the isolation of a specific faulty component. The code words 
Vu l se"  and "Check" refer to the application of a specific input and the evaluation of the 
response to  that input, relative to  a computer-stored characterization of the required 
response. 
A simple method of characterizing the required response of a component that 
includes a measure of both the static and dynamic response is illustrated in figure 18. 
The response y of a component to  a step input x is illustrated, with the lettered points 
referring to changes in the sign of the slope of the response y. The computer samples 
the response at intervals which a r e  sufficiently smaller than the oscillation period of the 
component and s tores  the values of the response at points A, B, C, . . .using a simple 
logic scheme to  detect when the slope of the response changes sign. Both the magnitude 
and the t ime of occurrence of these data are compared with desired values to test  com­
ponent performance - the simplest scheme being to s tore  only the last two points until 
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their  difference divided by their  sum is less than a specified fraction. This point in 
time is a direct measure of settling time, a common dynamic response characterization; 
the average value of these two points is a measure of component static, or trdc," response. 
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1 
TABLE I.- GRAY CODE FORMAT TO ADDRESS CMG PARAMETERS 
sequence Gray code I Gray code number address I CMG system parameter I Is::zz address 
I 
CMG system parameter 
I I 1  I 
I 
Spare 33 1 1 1  1 Spin current, CMG 3 
1 28-volt Supply, CMG 1 34 1 1 1 1 1 Left-bearingtemperature, CMG 3 1 
1 1 +15-v0lt Supply, CMG 1 35 1 1 1 1 1 1 Spare I 
1 ' -15-Volt Supply, CMG 1 36 11 1 1 1 1 Right-bearingtemperature, CMG3 1 
1 1 5-volt supply, CMG 1 37 1 1 1 1 Bearing, vibration, CMG 3 
6 1 1 1 28-volt Supply, CMG 2 I I1 38 1 1 1 1 1 Inner-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 3 
1 

l 7 1 1 26-Volt SUpply, CMG 2 I 39 1 1  1 1 Outer-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 3 

1 8 1 1 1 Rotor speed, CMG 1 1 4 0  1 1  1 1 Inner-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 2 I
1 1  1 Spin current, CMG 1 1 41 1 1 i Inner-gimbal tachometer, CMG 1 
1 1 1 +15-v0lt supply, CMG 2 ' 42 1 1 1 Outer-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 2 
' 11 I 1 1 1 11 28-volt supply, CMG 3 43 1 1 1 1 Inner-gimbal servo error ,  CMG 3 
; 12 j 1 1 1 1 -15-volt Supply, CMGI 44 1 1 1 Inner-gimbal servo error ,  CMG 2i 13 1 1 1 Left-bearing temperature, CMG 1 45 1 1 1 1 Outer-gimbal servoerror ,  CMG 3 
l 14 j
1 
1 1 1' 5-volt supply, CMG 2 46 1 1 1 1 1 Inner-gimbal motor tachometer, CMG 3 
15 1 1 Right-bearing temperature, CMG 1 47 1 1 1 1 Inner-gimbaltachometer, CMG 3' 16 1 Bearing vibration, CMG 1 48 1 1 1 Outer-gimbal servo error,  CMG 2 
' 17 I 1 1  1 Inner-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 1 i 49 ~ 1 1 Outer-gimbal motor tachometer, CMG 1 
1 i Outer-gimbal power amplifier., CMG 1 50 I1 1 1 II Inner-gimbal motor tachometer, CMG 2 
I 19 j 1 1 1 Inner-gimbal servo error ,  CMG 1 51 1 1 1 Outer-gimbal tachometer, CMG 1 
20 ; 1 1 1  i 26-Volt supply, CMG 2 52 1 ~ Outer-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 1 
II 21 j 1 1 1 1 I +15-volt supply, CMG 3 53 1 1 Inner-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 1 22 , 1 1 1 Rotor speed, CMG 2 54 1 1  1 Inner-gimbal tachometer, CMG 2 I

! 23 ' 1 1 , Outer-gimbal servo error ,  CMG 1 55 1 1 1 1  Outer-gimbal motor tachometer, CMG 3 

~ 24 , 1 1 1 1 Spin current, CMG2 56 1 1 1  , Outer-gimbal motor tachometer, CMG 2 

~ 25 , 1 1 1 1 -15-volt supply, CMG 3 57 1 1 1 1 ' Outer-gimbaltachometer, CMG 3 

I 26 1 1 1; Left-bearing temperature, CMG 2 ; 58 1 1 1 1 1 I Outer-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 3 

27 I 1 1 1 1 5-volt s ~ p p l y ,CMG 3 ! 59 1 1 1 1 ' Inner-gimbal power amplifier, CMG 3 

28 1 1 1 1 1 26-Volt supply, CMG 3 60 1 1 1 Outer-gimbal tachometer, CMG 2 
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Monitor /Diagnostic Maint enan ce signa Is 
II I /  I /  I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
Spacecraf t  systems
Switching 
uni t  
I Component status signals

I CMG system components 
Figure 1.- Maintenance system block diagram. 
I 
-  . , , . ... - .-
power supply 
(a) Signal-flow component. 
Heat 
(b) Energy-flow component. 

Figure 2.- Idealized maintenance components. 
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Figure 3.- Pilot control  console. L-69-4970.1 
t\3 
w 
Figure 4.- CMG control electronics laboratory. L-69-5141 
1 
Figure 5.- CMG system on moving base simulator. 1-69-5142 
L-69-5143

Figure 6.- Simulation program control station. 
Figure 7.- EMMA signal switching unit. L-69-5 144 
Comparator and 
Corrective 
64 CMG syste.n 
actuators 
d i sc re t e s  
Figure 8.- EMMA software and input-output block diagram. 
Figure 9.- EMMA pilot console panel. L-69-4977 
w 
0 
1Lr9-47, 
,-r----.­%vol t  sup2ly 5 v o l t s ]  
28-volt 
supply j nve r t e r  15-volt supply 1 5  v o l t s  1 
* 
26-volt SUWP? 
(490Hz)  26 v o l t s  i cMG 
I' 
28-volt -bus 
CMG 2 
1 I 26-volt supply 1- 26 v o l t s  
( L 3 0  Hzj 
JL.. '  
?-volt  supply 5 v o l t s  
I I 
I CMG 3 
I 26-volt supply 
26 v o l t s(L90 52) 
2&VOlt supply 1 
26-volt supply I 
Figure 10.- CMG system power-supply diagram. 
-- 
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+l>vo l t  e r r o r-
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-”-. 
. .. . . _, 
Replace R e pl a ce28-volt i n v e r t e r  
Figure 11.- CMG power-supply-failure isolation logic. 
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1- .. . ... 
0 9 / 1 9 / 6 9  08.18 .42 .  
CMG SYSTEM F A I L U R E  DETECTED 
+ 2 8  V O L T  * CMG 3 * AV READING= .0 1 1  
POWER SUPPLY REPLACED .................................................. 

0 9 / 1 9 / 6 9  f l8 .19.30.  
CMG SYSTEM F A I L U R E  DETECTED 
+ 2 6  V O L T  * CMG 3 * AV READING= .011 
POWER SUPPLY REPLACED ................................................... 
0 9 / 1 9 / 6 9  08.21.39.  
CMG SYSTEM F A I L U R E  DETECTED 
+ 1 5  V O L T  * CMG 3 * AV READING= .0 0 7  
POWER SUPPLY REPLACED ..................................................... 

0 9 / 1 9 / 6 9  0 8 . 2 4 . 1 3 .  
CMG SYSTEM F A I L U R E  DETECTED 
+ 	5 V O L T  * CMG 3 * AV READING= .009 
POWER SUPPLY REPLACEDJ;**********~:**~:************~******~***********~: 
0 9 / 1 9 / 6 9  08 .24 .28 .  
CMG SYSTEM F A I L U R E  DETECTED 
S P I N  CURRENT * CMG 3 J; AV READING= 0 0 3 7  
CMG F A I L E D  
MANUAL A S S I S T A N C E  REQUESTED .................................................. 

CMG SYSTEM CR I T ICAL FA I LURE 
CMG SYSTEM SHUT DOWN - RCS SYSTEM A C T I V A T E D  
REQUEST MANUAL CHECKOUT 
0 9 / 1 9 / 6 9  08.28 .11 .  
CMG SYSTEM F A I L U R E  DETECTED 
R I G H T  B E A R I N G  TMP* CMG 1 * AV READING= - 5 . 4 2 7  
CMG F A I L E D  
MANUAL A S S I S T A N C E  REQUESTED 
...................................................... 
Figure 12.- On-line typewriter output for EMMA operation. 
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Figure 13.- CMG system maintenance block diagram. 
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Figure 14.- CMG system diagnostic logic flow. 
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Figure 15.- Out-of-tolerance constraint detection. 
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Figure 16.- Spacecraft system maintenance block diagram. 
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Figure 17.- Diagnostic logic flow. 
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Figure 18.- Characterization of component dynamic and static response. 
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